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Abstract
In an innovative approach, applied to a region of the world on which research remains in
its infancy, this article identifies the dominant administrative reform traditions
embedded within the administrative elites responsible for administrative reform in
Eurasia. Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we establish a mechanism for measuring
bureaucrat perceptions of administrative reform that may be replicated in other
regions, by identifying the extent to which the three dominant Western traditions of
public service (traditional public administration, new public management and new public
governance) have been embedded in Eurasian societies. The article thereby demon-
strates the effectiveness of these turns in public administration to be ‘learned’
and become embedded within the psyche of elite-level bureaucrats in these
Eurasian post-Soviet regimes. The article posits that, while members of these
elites hold several common governance perceptions, understanding of administrative
reform differs markedly between bureaucrats and is broadly aligned with various
aspects of the three dominant turns in public administration. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that some rebalancing needs to take place between international/regional
public policy interventions and public administration interventions. While public
policy interventions are of course required, the administrative foundations upon
which they are built (or learned), require greater attention to the needs, skills and
attitudes of practitioners.
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Introduction
Broadly, the past 50 years have seen three public administration models cum
reform traditions advocated by Western scholars, each advocating a diﬀerent
role for the government oﬃcial or bureaucrat. The result is that oﬃcials have
received mixed messages as to how they should ﬁt into the metaphorical machine
of government. In this article, we investigate how the bureaucratic elite interpret
the term administrative reform, and identify the key motivations supporting their
behaviours. ‘Popular stereotypes and scholarly depictions do not provide a clear
understanding of how administrators perceive their roles and responsibilities or
how they use their considerable discretionary powers’ (de Graaf, 2011: 285; Selden
et al., 1999: 172). We therefore probe the conceptual foundations upon which
bureaucrats build their role conceptions. The research addresses the practical ques-
tions of administrative reform that inform the policy adoption and implementation
process in Eurasia, a region experiencing pronounced change following the collapse
of the Soviet Union, but which remains relatively under-investigated.
Why does a conception of administrative reform matter?
Responding directly to the concerns of those interested in why policy transfer or
‘translation’ may fail (Dunlop, 2017; Stone, 2017), our research focuses not on the
learning process, but on the basics of what knowledge is being updated, through
which we shed light on Dunlop’s original concern of why learners may fail to learn
or indeed, learn diﬀerently. Put diﬀerently, while a bureaucrat’s beliefs may be
updated through learning, how they internalise learning is predicated upon their
normative beliefs about what their role should be. The nature of policy learning
depends on one’s conception of public administration: lessons, similarly taught, are
internalised diﬀerently, based on one’s conceptions of administrative reform. To
what extent do Western conceptions of administrative exist among elite-level
bureaucrats?
Our research draws upon the three main traditions of public administration and
service: New Public Management (NPM), New Public Governance (NPG) and
Traditional Public Administration (TPA), as revived by Rhodes’ (2016) recent
scholarship. Within Eurasia, the research is situated within an emerging trans-
national network of elite-level bureaucrats tasked with reforming the public admin-
istrations of their respective countries: the Regional Hub of Civil Service in Astana,
a regional United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiative that aims
to increase the eﬀectiveness of civil service systems in Central Asia. Through part-
nerships and networking, it uses soft power to build administrative capacity
through peer-to-peer learning.
The article does not appraise the qualities of NPM, NPG or Rhodes’ ‘Craft
skills’ (based on the traditional model). Rather, it accepts that these ideal-types are
theoretically existent within the public sector. These attributes have been developed
over a number of years, with training supported by numerous interventions from
national, regional and international agencies. The article explores how the values of
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each of these administrative reform agendas are interpreted and internalised by
bureaucrats in Eurasia. As these reform agendas compete, there is no dominant
‘reform agenda’ or state narrative; latent narratives would, therefore, be expected to
come to the fore (Callahan and Olshfski, 2006) and guide decision making in
instances of discretion (Meier and O’Toole, 2006). What are these learning plat-
forms upon which policy learning takes place?
The next section outlines brieﬂy the three dominant traditions of administrative
reform, leading to the development of a set of indicators for measuring the dom-
inance of each of these traditions within a civil service. After a description of our
research methodology, we present the ﬁndings of the study, followed by a short
discussion and some concluding remarks.
Theoretical framework
Administrative reform suﬀers from that oft cited problem of pareto-eﬃcient poli-
cies: one cannot be against administrative reform – however, what is meant by the
term ‘administrative reform’ or an administrative reform agenda diﬀers across time
and across place, or what Radaelli (2005) refers to as new wine bottles with either
no wine or wine of variant quality inside. Rather than focusing on conceptions of
the state or administrative traditions of the state (Loughlin and Peters, 1997;
Loughlin et al., 2011), we have focused on the three dominant turns in public
administration research that have been compiled by Rod Rhodes (2016). Based
on Osborne (2010), Rhodes (1998), Bryson et al. (2014) and Rhodes (2016), the
section below summarises the key aspects of the (i) NPM, (ii) NPG and (iii) what
Rhodes has deﬁned as the ‘Craft’ agenda, based on the traditional model of public
administration (see also Robinson, 2015).
Narrative for theoretical type 1: NPM
Proponents of NPM are most concerned with government failures; they distrust big
government and believe in the eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of markets and rationality,
and devolution of authority to as close as possible to the citizen (or customer).
NPM has its roots in public choice theory (see, e.g. Breton, 1974; Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Downs, 1957, 1967; Dunleavy, 1991; Niskanen, 1971, 1973; Tullock,
1965, 1976), blending thinking from both pluralist and New Right paradigms.
Proponents favoured economic theory and positivist social science methodologies.
Regulation of service provision was to be one of the primary tasks of government.
While NPM remains a far from coherent doctrine (Hood, 1991), there are a
number of traits associated with it. NPM advocates citizens as consumers and
sees competition between consumers as a way of ensuring organisational account-
ability (Bryson et al., 2014: 446; Osborne, 2010; Rhodes, 2016). The belief that
private-sector eﬃciencies could be incorporated into the public sector underpinned
this reform agenda. Many NPM practices are still evident, and even being perpe-
tuated and promoted within civil service systems today: performance related pay
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and key performance indicators are seen as eﬀective mechanisms for increasing
performance levels. The recruitment of senior civil servants and ‘Tsars’ from the
private sector, it is argued, reduces ineﬃciencies. Government should be small,
regulating minimally the multiple service providers that should compete with
each other for funding. In short, governments should ‘steer, not row’: they
should make policy, but others should implement it. Many NPM advocates
would support the idea of supporting the business environment directly as a
means of improving conditions in society. Many of these policies and traditions
remain embedded within government practices although the heydays for NPM
were the 1970s and 1980s. Overall, the reforms espoused by the NPM agenda
have been unconvincing in terms of their eﬀects on productivity and eﬀectiveness
within the civil service (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 180–181).
Narrative for theoretical type 2: NPG
NPG has its origins in institutional and network theory. It advocates that the bur-
eaucracy works with partners in society – nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)
and civil society organisations (CSOs). It emphasises the importance of values and
relationships between people, organisations and interests. It is these networks that
inﬂuence values which, in turn, inﬂuence resource allocation. Civil servants should
have good mediation skills, encouraging cooperation between ministries, depart-
ments, civil society organisations and the private sector. If a Minister’s policy out-
come transcends departments, civil servants should be suﬃciently networked to
propose and deliver ‘joined-up’ government. The emphasis in NPG is on better regu-
lation, as opposed to less regulation. Civil servants should take the initiative in pro-
posing solutions to policy problems that they encounter; they should take ownership
of policy programmes, ensuring policies are well designed and implemented. Their key
task is to manage relationships. NPG also diﬀers from NPM in that it contends that
productivity performance in the public sector is related to ‘public service motivation’
as opposed to material rewards. As the failures of NPM became apparent in the early
1990s, Dutch and Anglo schools of NPG emerged, both advocating a range of social
actors in the policy process (Peters and Pierre, 2000). Much of this literature has
focused on the participation of various groups in the decision-making process. The
essential argument is that the more engaged bureaucrats are with users, the more they
will understand their needs and design a policy programme accordingly, leading to
more eﬀective outputs of government.
Narrative for theoretical type 3: The craft of public administration
TPA theory has its roots in political science and sociology. Based variously on
practical developments such as the Northcote–Trevelyan report (1854), and the
writings of Weber (in Rheinstein and Shils, 1954) and Wilson (1887), it had a
strong focus on meritocracy, the policy process and policy implementation.
TPA was the dominant tradition of public administration in Westminster systems
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of government, until the arrival of NPM. The bureaucrat is seen as the sole source of
advice to the Minister and resource decisions are arrived at through a strict hier-
archical process. Bureaucrats are guided by a public sector ethos. Rhodes’ (2016) and
Bryson et al.’s (2014) revisioning of the traditional model argues that ‘[w]hile eﬃ-
ciency was the main concern of TPA, and eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness are the main
concerns of NPM, values beyond eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness are pursued, debated,
challenged, and evaluated in the emerging approach. In this regard, the emerging
approach re-emphasizes and brings to the fore value-related concerns of previous
eras that were always present but not dominant’ (Bryson et al., 2014: 445; Denhardt
and Denhardt, 2011; Rosenbloom and McCurdy, 2006). In his re-envisioning of the
traditional model, Rhodes proposes that we should not throw the baby out with the
bathwater – TPA contained many skills required for ‘good-governing’. These, he
argues, are not antithetical but complimentary to many NPM and NPG reforms.
These craft skills are learned on the job, and are not systematised (Rhodes, 2016) and
include counselling, or in common public administration parlance, ‘speaking truth to
power’. There is stewardship, whereby bureaucrats possess expertise and institutional
memory and, unlike NPM managers, are ‘in it’ for the long haul, exuding practical
wisdom and prudence, where they carefully consider the implications of policy inter-
ventions and provide Ministers with advice accordingly, although this may often be
seen by Ministers as a delaying tactic or an attempt to frustrate their policy object-
ives. There is probity, whereby civil servants should be honest and have the full
conﬁdence of their Minister. The Minister should know that when their tenure
ends, the civil servant will not breach this conﬁdence with the next Minister.
Judgment exists since, not only is institutional memory important, but institutional
norms develop over a period and form stories that are used to inform judgment and
decisions. Diplomacy is the craft of being able to see the world from the ‘other’
perspective – the (dark) arts of negotiation and persuasion. Finally, there is the craft
skill of political-nous – astuteness in assessing the political lay of the land (Rhodes,
2016: 643–644). Of course, many of these skills overlap and are not mutually exclu-
sive, but the argument remains: these craft skills, associated with the traditional
Westminster model of public administration, not NPM or NPG, are an essential
element of the bureaucrat-politician relationship.
Public administration in Eurasia
Despite three rounds of NPM reform, Oleinik et al. (2015: 182), demonstrate that
reforms in Kazakhstan have not taken hold. Similarly, Janenova and Knox (2017:
1) and (Knox, 2019) ﬁnd that despite ‘signiﬁcant political endorsement at the high-
est level, administrative reforms in Kazakhstan have not had the intended eﬀects’.
In response, they suggest developing an outcomes-based model for administrative
reform. Baimenov and Everest-Phillips (2016) give their practitioner perspective
concurring that more needs to be done by reformists to take account for the insti-
tutional environment within which the reform is to take place. Summarising reform
literature, Massey (2013) argues that reform initiatives tend not to prioritise
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‘context’ as a key variable. Such a view draws on research by Perlman and Gleason
(2007: 1327) and others submitting that ‘values rather than formal institutions
under certain circumstances exert a determining inﬂuence in administrative devel-
opment’. Building on Massey (2013), and Perlman and Gleason (2007), we argue: if
administrative reform initiatives are to be successful, we need to understand the
latent narratives guiding bureaucrat behaviour. Our research, therefore, investi-
gates the bureaucratic conceptions of public administration upon which policy
learning takes place.
In their comparative analysis between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, two countries
with similar norms, values and experiences, Perlman and Gleason (2007: 1327) con-
clude that administrative reform is a function of policy choice rather than historical
cultural experiences. They reject the ‘Asian values’ explanation for administrative
reform in favour of a policy choice explanation. They suggest (2007: 1340) that ‘for
administrative theory to develop a robust and yet clearly speciﬁable understanding of
the role of culture in administrative process much more research is needed on the
politics [of] formal public institutions in cross cultural contexts’. By focusing on core
beliefs and values, our research responds to this call.
Oleinik et al. (2015) have demonstrated the links between the values and per-
ceptions of administrative reform. O’Connor, Janenova and Knox (2019) have
demonstrated that administrative reform initiatives in the region have not gener-
ated meaningful administrative reform. By using the lens of policy learning to focus
on the bureaucrat beliefs that are being updated, we can begin to understand why.
Methodology
To provide corroboration for our proposition, we employed Q-Methodology and
participant observation.
Q-Methodology
Based on the narratives outlined above, we developed a series of 48 statements,
sixteen relating to each tradition. These are reproduced in the order they were
presented to participants as shown in online supplementary Table 4. Q method-
ology is most concerned with determining a community members’ principled and
causal beliefs. It is an inverted factor analysis that seeks to determine a set of
existent viewpoints – it does not seek to determine the extent to which these view-
points are ascribed (Kitzinger, 1987). Hence, akin to elite interviews, we draw on
low numbers of targeted respondents in order to establish the extent to which
Western models of Administrative reform have become embedded within the
region. Brown (1980) suggests that ‘enough subjects to establish the existence of
a Factor/Typology for purposes of comparing with another Factor/Typology’ is
what is required. Generally, one participant for every two Q statements suﬃces,
and due to the inversion, there are usually less interviewees than statements (Watts
and Stenner, 2012). In other words, this P set is usually smaller than the Q set
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(Brouwer, 1999). The aim is to have four or ﬁve persons deﬁning each anticipated
viewpoint, which are often two to four, and rarely more than six. (Brown, 1978)
Van Exel and de Graaf (2005: 5/6) As in elite interviews, Q participants should be
well informed and ‘selected to represent the breadth of opinion in a target popu-
lation, not the distribution of beliefs across the population’ (Weber et al., 2009).
See O’Connor (2014, 2017) for more developed argument on the use of Q
Methodology in public administration research. To determine our interviewee
population, a list of current members of the Regional Hub was drawn up. Those
members who had attended at least two Regional Hub Committee meetings in the
past two years (50% attendance) were identiﬁed and contacted – a list consisting of
24 people. This population was then contacted by e-mail and telephone. Of these,
15 were able to complete the online Q-sort, spending between 20min and 1 h
completing the Q-sort. Respondents were elite-level bureaucrats in their respective
administrations, holding either the position of director or head of service with
responsibility for administrative reform. They originated from: Armenia (1),
Azerbaijan (4), Georgia (4), Kazakhstan (2), Kyrgyzstan (1), Mongolia (1) and
Ukraine (2). Data collection took place between September and December 2016.
Participant observation
The team have attended and monitored three Regional Hub events between 2015
and 2017. These meetings took place in Russian with simultaneous translation
provided for the research team. Informal, semi-structured interviews were held
with most participants at each event. Interviewees were asked to speak about
their understanding of the what the role of the public sector should be and their
role within it. They were also asked about the obstacles to administrative reform in
their own countries and to name examples of what they perceived to be best prac-
tice in other countries. Notes from the participant observation and related semi
structured interviews assisted the interpretation the Q results.
Findings
Based on these theoretical conceptions of administrative reform, hub members
identiﬁed three types of perceptions. Before identifying the deﬁning characteristics
of these three typologies, there are a number of conceptions that are shared by all
hub members. These are identiﬁed in the section below. The numbers in brackets
refer to the number of the statements supporting the claim in the text. The state-
ments and corresponding numbers are presented in online supplementary Table 4
in the order they were presented to participants.
Common conceptions
All listed statements are non-signiﬁcant at P> .01 and those with an * are also non-
signiﬁcant at P> .05. Respondents unanimously reject the idea that the civil service
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is too privileged and interventionist (3*). In terms of a bureaucrat’s attachment to
the three theoretical positions outlined above, it is seen that bureaucrats tend to
reject (to varying degrees) the neo-liberal idea that supporting businesses ﬁrst will
allow beneﬁts to ﬂow to citizens (24). There is also a tendency (again to varying
degrees) to reject the idea of the regulatory state. Rather, the best way to ensure
eﬃcient public services is to facilitate and regulate the private sector in service
provision (26*). They also slightly disagree that value for money is a primary
consideration in the policy-making process (30*).
Role perception
In general, bureaucrats in the region view their primary role as that of a coordin-
ator: coordinating various departments and agencies to ensure the implementation
of policy (13*). They are also not afraid to take a leadership role in divisive policy
issues (34). However, they do not see it as their role to coordinate actors outside the
civil service, largely disagreeing with the statement: ‘the key task of the bureaucrat
is to manage the relationship between my department, the market and interest
groups’ (36*).
Interaction with the political level
They profoundly object to allocating resources according to political criteria (47*)
but generally, do not see it as their responsibility to act as a counterweight to
partisan arguments (40). Bureaucrats in the region demonstrate comprehensive
agreement with the statement: ‘My allegiance is to the state, not to a particular
political ideology, party or leader’ (14*). All typologies placed this statement in the
most strongly agree category.
In summary, no dominant administrative reform agenda is evident, which may
be interpreted to mean that the various cycles of reform have each left a legacy, the
result being an amalgam of ideas and concepts on what the role and function of a
bureaucrat actually is, or should be.
In the next section, the diﬀerences between three typologies are identiﬁed. Each
of the typologies identiﬁed is loosely aligned with one of the dominant theoretical
administrative reform schools. There is no correlation between gender and typ-
ology alignment, nor does the sample size allow for investigating a correlation
between country and typology alignment.
Typology weightings
Table 1 reﬂects the narrative presented above: that respondents have many attri-
butes in common. The left-hand column identiﬁes the interviewee by number, while
the top row identiﬁes the typology number. The ‘X’ denotes that the bureaucrat’s
responses contributed to the makeup of that typology. The other two numbers in
the row identify the extent to which each bureaucrat identiﬁes with each of the
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other typologies. All listed statements are signiﬁcant at P> .05 and those with an *
are also signiﬁcant at P> .01.
Factor weights are merged with the raw data to generate each of the factors
identiﬁed in online supplementary Table 4. The X denotes that the individual’s
responses contributed to the composition of that factor. Put diﬀerently, the
respondent of course shares some attributes of each category, however the respond-
ent has more in common with one group than the other groups. How that same
individual relates to each of the other factors can also be understood by looking at
the other ﬁgures in the row.
Table 2 identiﬁes the similarity between the typologies.
Typology 1 (aligned with NPG)
Role perception
It is the only typology that interprets its role to prioritise ‘ensuring policies are
successfully designed and implemented’ (35*). While these bureaucrats are politic-
ally impartial, they will defend the interests of their department (42*). They are
the factor most likely to agree with the statement that ‘a bureaucrat’s work
requires judgment based on practical wisdom because the rule book does not
have all the answers’ (44). They are the most likely typology to agree with
the statement that ‘experienced oﬃcials should know how to inﬂuence the govern-
ance process’ (29).
Table 1. Typology formulation.
QSORT 1 2 3
1 1 0.0642 0.0614 0.7950X
2 2 0.5271X 0.3295 0.2271
3 3 0.4465X 0.3265 0.2512
4 4 0.4097X 0.0293 0.1656
5 5 0.7800X 0.2571 0.0751
6 6 0.2809 0.2343 0.5732X
7 7 0.6784X 0.0654 0.3673
8 8 0.2049 0.3342 0.7145X
9 9 0.1496 0.6270X 0.2580
10 10 0.4231 0.5596X 0.0198
12 12 0.6322X 0.3868 0.0628
13 13 0.6486X 0.1469 0.1606
14 14 0.0657 0.8399X 0.1962
15 15 0.5579X 0.5448 0.0625
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Relationship with civil society
Typology 1 does not see it as the role of the oﬃcial to seek out NGO or CSO
assistance in the design (21*) or implementation (2*) of policy.
Relationship with the political level
Bureaucrats weighing on type one do not automatically follow the directions of their
political masters (43). Together with typology three, they most strongly agree that it
is their primary role to oﬀer frank and fearless advice to the political level (39).
Dominant administrative reform tradition
While they do concede that many motivations of the public and private sector are
similar (41*) and that, in terms of management, the public sector can learn a lot
from the private sector (1), they strongly disagree with the idea that members of the
private sector should be recruited to the upper echelons of the civil service (25*).
They most strongly disagree with the NPM assertion that bureaucrats and their
departments should be measured quantitatively by their results (8*) and with
Niskanen’s (1971) idea that public sector bodies should compete for resources (6*).
Skills valued
The role of the oﬃcial, according to type one bureaucrats, is to encourage cooper-
ation between people and departments (22). They believe that collaborative lead-
ership is the key to policy success (33*) and take an active role mediating conﬂicting
interests (5). They are also the most rule-bound of our typologies, agreeing with the
statement that it is their responsibility to follow the rules, no matter what the
circumstances (4*). Technically, they are in favour of Central Regulatory Units
to measure regulatory quality (27), but do not agree that these regulatory and
contracting skills are the most important skills of a bureaucrat (23*).
Summary
In summary, this typology sees it as their role to bring about policy change; this
being the role of the civil service rather than outside organisations. They have a
Table 2. Differences between factors.
1 2 3
1 1.0000 0.1979 0.3686
2 0.1979 1.0000 0.0824
3 0.3686 0.0824 1.0000
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good working relationship with the political level and will oﬀer frank
advice when necessary. The public sector can learn a lot from the private sec-
tor in terms of management, but it should not try to emulate the private sec-
tor in all respects. This typology sees the merit in attaining regulatory skills,
but these are seen as secondary to the more important skills of governance.
They generally possess many of the skills associated with the NPG agenda.
They agree with some of the craft statements and reject others. They generally
reject the NPM skills.
Typology 2 (aligned with NPM)
Role perception and relationship with civil society
While rejecting the essential skills required of the Craft agenda, they do not reject
all elements of NPG, seeing it as their role to seek out NGOs to assist them in the
implementation (2*), and to a lesser extent development (21) of public policy.
These bureaucrats do not see it as their role to be politically impartial and
defend the interests of their departments (42*).
Relationship with the political level
Their relationship with the political level diﬀers from other typologies – they do not
see it as their role to oﬀer free and frank advice to the political level (39*). Nor do
they agree with the statement that they should inﬂuence the governance process
(29*). However, they are the individuals most likely to hold onto their technical
beliefs when faced with opposition from the political level (43).
Dominant administrative reform tradition
Bureaucrats weighing signiﬁcantly on this typology argue for government that is
smaller and more eﬃcient (9*). They also strongly agree with the NPM assertion
that bureaucrats and their departments should be measured quantitatively by their
results (8*). They embrace the idea of business people being involved in the gov-
ernance process (17*) and believe that many of the motivations of the public and
private sectors are similar (41*).
Skills valued
They value regulatory and contracting skills (23*). These skills are prioritised over
skills associated with craft. These bureaucrats disagree with the following state-
ments: experienced oﬃcials should know how to inﬂuence the governance process;
(29*) negotiation and persuasion skills are one of the most important skills of a
bureaucrat (45*) and collaborative leadership across departments is crucial to
ensure policy success (33*).
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Summary
This typology is closest to NPM. This is the only typology to fully embrace working
with NGOs and CSOs. They will defend the interests of their departments but do not
see it as their role to challenge the political level. They are open to private sector ideas
and personnel being incorporated into the public sector and are the most technocratic
of our typologies. They will hold on to their technical beliefs – but will not try and
inﬂuence the ‘political’ process through persuasion and negotiation. They are the
bureaucrats most likely to focus on evidence based policy, to the detriment of cultural
and societal factors. This typology positively identiﬁes with many of the NPM ideas.
They also, to a lesser extent, identify with NPG reforms. They reject the Craft skills.
Typology 3 – (aligned with the craft of public administration)
Role perception
This typology attributes a lot of importance to the technical aspects of their role
(28*). However, technicality does not mean skills such as the understanding the
details of regulatory reform (23). Rather, technicality is interpreted as being closer
to the generalist civil servant. They interpret their role as to oﬀer Ministers frank
and fearless advice (39). Similar to other typologies, they are not concerned with
how their decisions will look on the front page of a newspaper (38*) – however,
they do not disagree with this statement to the same extent as the other typologies.
They do not see it as their role to mediate conﬂicting interests (5) but strongly agree
that collaborative leadership across departments is crucial to ensure policy success
(33*, 22, 13). They see it as their role to develop clear roles for team members (32).
Relationship with civil society
While this typology would consult with NGOs regarding the implementation of
policy, they would be less inclined to involve them in the policy formulation/design
process (2,21).
Their relationship with the political level
When a conﬂict of interest arises with the political level, they will not provide
unquestioning political support (43*). These bureaucrats do not see it as their
role to build a relationship with the political level (12*).
Dominant administrative reform tradition
It is the only typology that agrees that the motivations of the public and private
sectors are diﬀerent (41*). They tend to agree that bureaucrats and departments
should be measured quantitatively by results (8*) and that public–private partner-
ships are good (45). Interestingly, they also believe the private sector to be more
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eﬃcient than the public sector (16). However, they disagree with many of the NPM
ideals. This suggests that this type, while they believe in the public delivery of
services, is frustrated by the ineﬃciencies they regularly encounter within their
departments. This typology disagrees with the following NPM sentiments:
. In terms of management, the public sector can learn a lot from the private
sector (1*);
. Key Performance Indicators are good way of measuring success (19*);
. Public sector bodies should compete with each other for funding (6*);
. In this era of administrative reform, regulatory and contracting skills are one of
the most important skills of the bureaucrat (23*).
They are the only typology to strongly disagree with the statement: ‘The solution
to many policy problems begins with developing partnerships, encouraging mod-
ernisation and joined up government’ (11*).
Skills valued
Adherents of typology three recognise the need to be politically impartial but will
act in the best interests of their departments (42*). They believe collaborative
leadership to be crucial for ensuring policy success (33*). They embrace the craft
skills of weighing the merits of competing stories. (46*). Negotiation and persua-
sion skills are also highly valued (45).
Summary
This typology gives prominence to the technique of policy making. However,
unlike typology 2, which prioritises evidence-based policy making and the techno-
cratic details of the process, this typology prioritises the techniques of collaborative
leadership and negotiation. They are also open to the idea of working with NGOs
and CSOs – but in a diﬀerent way than type one. Apart from public private part-
nerships, they completely reject the NPM agenda. While they do disagree with a
few craft skills, they overwhelmingly support the majority of craft skills and to a
lesser degree those skills associated with NPG.
Summary of the findings
Discussion
Key finding one: Rebalancing the focus: Public policy and public administration. Epistemic
community literature informs us that, to have inﬂuence, the community must have
a shared technocratic and expert focus (Table 3). However, our study has found
that, while Eurasian Regional Hub members are very attached to the ideas of
administrative reform, how they perceive administrative reform diﬀers greatly,
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implying that that no dominant narrative exists among public administration
reform practitioners in the region. Unlike in Europe, where epistemic communities
have emerged from committees of bureaucrats, our evidence demonstrates no such
commonality of core beliefs in Eurasia. Davis-Cross (2013: 148), as part of her
review of the epistemic community literature, recommends that scholarly research
needs to focus on the internal cohesion of epistemic communities. Our case study
demonstrates that, on a superﬁcial level, committee members share policy core
(perhaps even deep core) beliefs about the need for administrative reform, indeed
many of them share some ‘common governance beliefs’ (see section ‘Common
conceptions’), however how these beliefs are manifest diﬀers.
In seeking to identify how administrative reform is interpreted by leading civil
servants in Eurasia, the study has demonstrated that senior bureaucrats within the
region possess three diﬀerent perceptions of administrative reform. These percep-
tions diﬀer remarkably. There is no correlation between any primary factor such as
nationality or gender and typology alignment, suggesting that there is no dominant
state or regional narrative on administrative reform. Secondly, these conceptions of
administrative reform are based on the three dominantWestern traditions of admin-
istrative reform though they do not neatly align with any one of these traditions.
Rather, the absence of a dominant narrative of administrative reform has allowed
respondents to draw on their own interpretations of administrative reform. There is,
moreover, no shared sense of purpose, no ‘community of practice’ or ‘epistemic
community’. While knowledge on policy content is exchanged at regular meetings
of regional bureaucrats, there exists no shared understanding of the fundamentals of
an administrative reform agenda. The focus of many regional interventions has been
policy and process-speciﬁc: knowledge exchange on best anti-corruption practice,
performance related pay, oversight agencies etc. The research presented here sug-
gests that knowledge exchange should also focus on the role of the public service in
Eurasia, and correspondingly, the role of the bureaucrat within it (in a normative
sense). Thus, some rebalancing needs to take place between international and regio-
nal public policy interventions and public administration interventions.While public
policy interventions are of course required, the administrative foundations upon
which they are built (or learned), require greater practitioner attention and an aware-
ness – and recognition – of the centrality of people (i.e. the bureaucrats themselves,
their role, their values and motivations or ethos) in the policy process.
While recent reviews of the learning literature have focused on learning modes,
this research has focused on the underlying assumptions upon which the bureau-
crat learns: what is being updated so to speak. As the administrative tradition
inﬂuences receptiveness to reform (Huxley et al., 2016), international organisations
interested in developing a policy transfer/learning/translation platform need, there-
fore, to begin by developing a shared understanding of the meaning of public
administration reform, before seeking policy change through policy learning; for
what may be learned may not be what the teacher had intended.
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While it remains to be seen if a shift in core governance beliefs occurs within this
emerging transnational network, the evidence presented here demonstrates that
Western doctrines of administrative reform have inﬂuenced bureaucratic role con-
ceptions. The various cycles of reform have, over the last 30 years, become
embedded in the local bureaucracy and indeed have left a legacy – of sorts; pointing
to the eﬀectiveness of international policy experts in transmitting the latest ideas
across the region. Nonetheless, in place of a consensus, the result is now that an
amalgam of ideas and concepts on the fundamental basics of administrative reform
exists within the region.
Key finding two: The craft skills of public administration
The organization and functioning of public administration have proven to be one
of the major politically and socially divisive issues across multi-ethnic societies
(O’Connor and Vaesen, 2018: 835). To improve our understanding of bureaucrat
role conceptions, Rhodes (2016:645) has advocated for a more systematic account
of the craft skills of the bureaucrat, drawing on current bureaucrat experiences.
Our research speaks to this call: instead of simply measuring the extent to which the
Craft Skills of public administration exist within the bureaucratic population, our
methodological design has allowed us to identify the prominence of these skills in
relation to the competing skills identiﬁed by NPM and NPG doctrines. The results
lend support to Rhodes’ (2016: 644) thesis that it is not a case of NPM nor NPG
versus the traditional model but acknowledging that the traditional skills ‘remain
essential and need protecting’. While these skills are prevalent in one of our typol-
ogies, elements appear in the other two typologies. In our bid to establish a
common conception of ‘what works’ in public policy, we must not forget about
the foundations upon which policies are implemented.
Concluding remarks
The article has presented evidence supporting Rhodes’ (2016) recent research that
some of the key ‘craft skills’ of the traditional bureaucrat, exist and are valued, in
part, in Eurasia. Further, the research has outlined the success of an international
network in bringing together bureaucrats from many Eurasian countries, where
many other attempts at regional cooperation have failed. Such success demon-
strates the value of the epistemic community approach in developing international
cooperation. While these networks look like epistemic communities, their role con-
ceptions diﬀer considerably – there is no common conception of administrative
reform. Our research, therefore, demonstrates a need for practitioners to rebalance
their emphasis and focus on the key skills of public administration (potentially
reinforcing an ethos of public service), rather than solely on the content of par-
ticular public policies or programmes.
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